An Analysis of the Characteristics of Temporary Employment in the Ecuadorian Labor Market: A Microeconometric Study by Guerra, José, Luis, Casco
An Analysis of the Characteristics of Temporary
Employment in the Ecuadorian Labor Market: A
Microeconometric Study
MPP Professional Paper
In Partial Fulﬁllment of the Master of Public Policy Degree Requirements
The Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Aﬀairs
The University of Minnesota
José Luis Casco Guerra
May 5th, 2014
Signature below of Paper Supervisor certiﬁes successful completion of oral presentation and completion of
ﬁnal written version:
Dr. Deborah Levison Date, oral presentation Date, paper completion
Dr. Elizabeth Davis Date, oral presentation Date, paper completion
Dr. Yuhong Yang Date, oral presentation Date, paper completion
1 Introduction
Employment stability has been a widely discussed topic among Ecuadorian policy mak-
ers. In the last few decades Latin American economies have become increasingly volatile.
In response, many countries have enacted policies to increase the ﬂexibility of their labor
markets, to mitigate the high levels of unemployment. These new contractual regulations
allowed ﬁrms to hire employees with fewer employer liabilities and contract expiration or
dismissal costs. As Belot et al. (2002) explain, many reforms in the labor market produce
the intensiﬁcation of the use of contracts that foster low ﬁring costs. In Ecuador, labor ﬂexi-
bility in Ecuador started to be implemented in 1990 with a legislation called Ley of Maquilas
(Factories Law).1 Subsequently, a whole body of new legislations was issued in the 1990s
and the beginning of 2000s, complementing the previous regulations, introducing new types
of ﬂexible structures for hiring workers, in order to reduce unemployment (See Aguiar 2007).
As Blank and Freeman (1994) explain, the objective of changing the legal structure of labor
contracts is to diminish the eﬀect of unemployment. Since the introduction of these em-
ployment structures, many employees have been hired under these types of contracts. Many
politician and policy makers, unions, employees and social sectors have argued against these
new ﬂexible labor contracts claiming that they have negative consequences on the relative
stability of the workers and did not have signiﬁcant positive impacts on aggregate unem-
ployment and job quality. In 2008, the National Assembly of Ecuador decided to eliminate
many types of ﬂexible labor contracts.
Consequently, the role of temporary contracts has increased interest and concern among
researchers and policy makers. In this context, it is necessary to identify and understand
the fundamental variables that characterize temporary employment, because as De Cuyper
et al. (2008) explain, the contractual structures have an eﬀect not only on the employee's
side but also on the demand (ﬁrms) side of the labor market. In this paper we study
the determinants of temporary contracts in the Ecuadorian labor market, as well as the
diﬀerences in the probability of men and women of obtaining this type of contract. As, Boeri
et al. (2005) explain, diﬀerent characteristics may determine the labor market behavior of
women. Therefore, it is necessary to study and understand the variables that inﬂuence
temporary employment in order to provide policy recommendations and contribute from an
academic perspective to the discussion of the Ecuadorian labor market structure.
Various methods help to explore the structure of temporary employment. We are go-
ing to undertake several analysis that use micro data, in order to identify the determinants
and the individual characteristics associated with temporary employment. Additionally, it
is important to analyze whether men and women have dissimilar motives for working un-
1Maquilas are manufacturing factories that operate in a free trade zones, under duty-free and tariﬀ-free conditions.
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der temporary contracts. As we are going to see in this analysis, men and women, indeed,
have diﬀerent reasons for engaging in temporary employment. There are diverse personal,
occupational, regional, and institutional reasons that inﬂuence this decision and it is neces-
sary to measure the impact of these characteristics in the probability of having a temporary
contract.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the
literature. Section 3 provides an overview of the characteristics of the Ecuadorian labor
market. Section 4 oﬀers the description of the methodology underlying the empirical work
and describes the data set extracted from the ENEMDU. Section 5 presents the estimation
results. Finally, a succinct conclusion in Section 6 completes the paper.
2 A Brief Review of the Literature
In Ecuador, labor instability and underemployment has been a severe problem for the
last two decades. In this context, temporary employment has gradually become an impor-
tant topic in terms of the political and economic discussion. The increase in the use of
ﬂexible contracts has been widely discussed in the literature. Uzzi et al. (1998) explain the
displacement and substitution of permanent employments with temporary employments in
United States and other industrialized countries. Booth et al. (2002) and the report of the
OECD (2002), devoted considerable attention to the analysis of contractual situations and
the eﬀects on employees. The literature uses diverse methods to identify the main elements
that have an eﬀect on temporary employment. Also, there are several perspectives to ex-
plain the factors that inﬂuence temporary employment. Many literature contributions that
explain the phenomenon of temporary employment concentrates on looking at the supply
side of the labor market. For example, Blosfeld et al. (2005) tries to elucidate the impact
of globalization and uncertainty in determining the employment stability. From the search
and match perspective of the labor market, globalization and technological progress have
an impact in this process by allowing job mobility and by providing diﬀerent employment
opportunities for the worker. However, these eﬀects are mitigated due to higher competition
and uncertainty which induce people to keep their employments, increasing the job stability
and diminishing temporary employment (see also Auer 2005).
The literature in this topic has also analyzed the role of institutional factors of a country.
Cebian et al. (2000) and Cahuk et al. (2001) explain how institutional factors or regulations
impact the structure of temporary contracts. In the same perspective, Kahn (2007) tries to
explain how the employment protection reforms had an eﬀect on temporary employment in
Europe. These studies try to establish a relationship between formal institutions and tem-
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porary employment.2 Other studies tried to investigate the eﬀects that collective bargaining
(unions) have on temporary employment. Several analyses demonstrate that unions play an
important role by generating a negative impact on the use of temporary employees (Uzzi et
al., 1998; Olsen et al., 2004).3
On the other hand, several factors on the demand side of the labor market also have
an eﬀect on temporary employment. Many studies analyze the cost structure of the ﬁrms.
For instance, Houseman (2001) explain that lower costs4 are associated with temporary
employees, which in the framework of a proﬁt maximizer ﬁrm boosts the use of temporary
workers. Another interesting perspective from the demand side of the labor market is the
one presented by Uzzi et al. (1998). They explain the relationship between market structure
and temporary employment, ﬁnding an increasing tendency to contract temporary employees
when ﬁrms are facing growing markets. They argue that hiring temporary workers is a
strategy of the ﬁrm to reduce costs and be competitive.
There are several perspectives in the economic literature about the eﬀects of labor ﬂexibil-
ity on employment. For example, Bentolila et al. (1994) explain the eﬀects of labor ﬂexibility
on wages in Sapin, Blanchard et al. (2002) describe the eﬀects on ﬁxed duration contract
due to labor reforms in France, and Cahuc et al. (2002) explain the interrelation between the
performance of labor markets and temporary employment. Many authors also argue that
implementing ﬁxed-term contracts it is not a necessary condition to increase employment.
Instead, the implementation of ﬁxed-term contracts may lead to the creation of a dualism5
in the labor market. (Bentolila et al. 1994, Blanchard et al. 2002, Cahuc et al. 2002).6
Many researchers have argued about the importance of ﬁxed-term contracts as a building
block on the path towards regular contracts with longer duration. However, there can be
mixed employment eﬀects due to the implementation of ﬁxed-term contracts. The intro-
duction of this type of contractual arrangement could raise dualism and limits the eﬀective
mechanisms of workers to obtain a permanent employment. Güell (2000) explains the rela-
tion between unemployment and ﬁxed-term contracts from an eﬃciency wage perspective,
showing the consequences of implementing ﬁxed-term contracts in an unaltered regulatory
framework.7
Several analyses in the literature showed how in many OECD countries, temporary em-
ployment has systematically gained ground. This type of job structure is currently present in
many labor markets, albeit permanent employment is the most desired form of contract. For
instance, there is an analysis of the situation of the labor market in Spain and its associated
2To further investigate the interplay of institutional factors, it is also important to review the works of Lindbeck et al.
(2002), Scarpetta (1996) and Olsen et al. (2004).
3Another study that is in concordance with these conclusions is one conducted by Salladerre et al. (2007) for nineteen
European countries.
4Lower costs imply, for example, the absence of social security or smaller social security beneﬁt packages, precarious systems
of incentives and smaller wages. These lower costs for the ﬁrms encourage the hiring of temporary workers.
5Dualism is a segmentation of the labor market into several distinct sub-labor markets e.g. formal and informal sectors.
6Other interesting perspectives in this issue include: Aguirregabiria et al. (1999), Alonso-Borrego et al. (2002), Güell (2000)
and Saint-Paul (1996).
7Güell (2000) argues that an economy achieves a lower employment equilibrium due to the eﬀects of substituting ﬁxed-term
for permanent contracts.
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ﬂexible regulatory framework. This study shows that implementing temporary employment
is a consequence of economic policies designed to foster labor ﬂexibility and ﬁrms' proﬁts
instead of employees' security and welfare (Dolado et al. 2002; Güell et al. 2007).
In contrast, other analyses oﬀer an explanation in favor of temporary contracts. For ex-
ample De Witte et al. (2003) explain the consequences of temporary work in job satisfaction
and organizational commitment in four European countries, and Engellande et al. (2005)
show that employees that work on a temporary basis tend to provide higher levels of eﬀort
compared to permanent employees.8 These studies suggest that working on a temporary
basis does not imply poor working conditions or negative consequences for the employees.
They argue that positive results can be obtained by introducing temporary employment
schemes.
Some authors have tried to determine the characteristics of individuals who have tempo-
rary employment. It has been showed that employees who work under temporary schemes are
frequently younger individuals with lower levels of education and limited working experience
(see for instance, Russo et al. 1997; Hipple 2001; Valenzuela, 2003). Similar conclusions can
be encountered in the analysis conducted by Booth et al. (2000). Likewise, Salladarre et al.
(2007) obtained similar results in his analysis of the determinants of temporary employment
using the European Social Survey.
There are several analyses that establish a linkage between ﬂexible labor contracts and
female labor participation (Casey et al. 2004; Boeri et al. 2005; Hipple 2001; Salladerre et
al. 2007). Other studies clarify the positive association between temporary employment and
the birth of a child and the eﬀects of changing marital status (Wiens-Tuers et al. 2002; Boeri
et al. 2005). In the framework of the unemployment duration, some studies have shown that
when unemployment takes place, the future probability of ﬁnding an employment of longer
duration decays. However, these studies also show that when a person has been unemployed,
the probability of ﬁnding temporary employment increases (See Chalmers et al. 2000; Guell
et al. 2000).9
In Latin America and especially in Ecuador there is a lack of analyses to explore the
causes and consequences of temporary employment contracts. One analysis for Ecuador is
performed by Chavez et al. (2012) who analyze some of the characteristics that would make
it possible the existence of the ﬁxed-term employment by branch of activity. However, as
Zelaschi (2007) explain, there have been some contributions towards answering some of the
questions regarding this area of research in other countries. Therefore, additional research is
needed to help scholars and policy makers better characterize temporary employment. This
paper tries to contribute to the understanding of temporary employment in the framework
of a small developing market economy.
8Similar results are exposed by Feldman (2005). Additional relevant studies in this area include Thorsteinson (2003) and
Martin et al. (1995).
9A good discussion of these perspectives can be found in Booth et al. (2000) and Salladerre et al. (2007).
5
3 Characterizing the Fluctuations of the Ecuadorian Economy
A functional analysis that describes an economy should not assume ex-ante that a par-
ticular system behaves in a certain theoretical manner. Moreover, economic analysis of the
framework of Latin-American countries should be careful to consider complex situations of
uncertainty and turbulence in these economies. Therefore, an applied econometric analysis
have to start analyzing important stylized facts that an economy presents.10 In the perspec-
tive of Taylor (2004), empirical generalizations obtained should be understood as the result
of social relations over an empirical framework of social accountability. Moreover, to model
social relations and infer the eﬀects of diﬀerent economic policies, it is of vital importance
to analyze the economic data of a country in a holistic way. This section will describe the
empirical characteristics of the Ecuadorian economy.
3.1 A brief overview of the Ecuadorian Economy
Commonly it is assumed that the level of real GDP is a good indicator of the quality
of life and welfare in an economy. In the context of real business cycles, GDP is the most
important component. It is known that in times of high economic growth (booms) living
standards of the population improve, there is less unemployment, increased production and
also higher consumption. Conversely, when the economy experiences recessionary times
conditions deteriorate.
To understand what is behind cyclical movements in the Ecuadorian economy it is neces-
sary to overview some historical and economic framework during the period of analysis. At
the beginning of the 1990s, the Ecuadorian economy took advantage of a stable international
environment characterized by high oil prices and the increase of exports of non-traditional
products. Moreover, the economy beneﬁted from an increase in foreign direct investment
which incentivized private activity and the restructuring of the external debt via the Brady
Plan. All of these situations are reﬂected in the increase of GDP during these years.
Nevertheless, this situation was not sustainable and since 1997 national production has
shrank because of the powerful eﬀects of the El Niño phenomenon which leads to a dra-
matically reduction in the productivity of many economic sectors. Additionally, the decline
in price levels, the insolvency of the ﬁnancial system and macroeconomic instability aﬀected
the performance of the Ecuadorian economy.
The economy of Ecuador at this point was very unstable and in 1998 the incumbent
10This vision is in concordance with the emphasis that a structuralism vision of the economy presents, mainly based on
realistic 'stylized facts' or empirical generalizations at macro, sectorial and micro level about the economy in the study (see
Kaldor, 1963).
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government was unable to prevent the rise of interest rates and the restriction of credit. The
result was an increase of the ﬁscal deﬁcit and the deterioration of the trade balance, triggering
a high devaluation process of the national currency (see Naranjo 2005). In addition to these
issues, the eﬀect of the Asian crisis and the fall of oil prices seriously aﬀected the overall
national economy. In 1999, a forced bank holiday was decreed, which at that time sent an
image of an unstable ﬁnancial system and triggered the loss of conﬁdence in the economic
agents. Additionally, this crisis was also generated by factors such as the deregulation of
the banking system, the inﬂuence of powerful groups on technical and political decisions,
and greater demands of international and multilateral credit institutions. This situation
produced consequences in the real sector of the economy evidenced by the negative eﬀects
in employment, consumption, investment and imports.
In 2000, in order to mitigate the eﬀects of the crisis, the government decided to dollarize
the economy. At that time, the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE) ﬁxed the exchange rate
to the U.S. dollar at 25,000 sucres.11 Since then, the newly adopted policies produced a
momentary stabilization. After this period of crisis, the economy started to grow again due
to the reactivation of production and the recovery of household consumption.
These turbulent scenarios have produced structural changes in the labor market. Many
employment polices have in some way aﬀected the stability of the workers and have promoted
the creation of several temporary employment contractual arrangements.12
It is important to remember that labor ﬂexibility in Ecuador was formally introduced in
1990 with the Ley de Régimen de Maquila y Contratación Laboral a Tiempo Parcial-Ley 90 13
and other legal ﬁgures for part time work contracts. The aim of this law was the increase of
employment by fostering technology transfer and the creation of new technology production
sectors. The employees who worked under this new labor structure were considered part of
the formal labor sector of the economy, even though they had less protection and job stability.
This law, in conjunction with other labor legislation, generated a volatile situation for workers
as the employers had the opportunity to terminate contracts with fewer responsibilities in
terms of compensation payments. Moreover, in 2000, the Ecuadorian governments issued two
laws in order to introduce the dollar as the legal tender and to promote the modernization
and privatization of the Ecuadorian economy. These two laws deepened the instability of the
of the workers by introducing other types of contracts to hire employees with less liabilities.14
The reforms introduced in these laws were considered essential as a way to ensure access to
11The sucre was the national currency of the Republic of Ecuador between 1884 and 2000 before the dollarization process
that took place on January 10th of 2000.
12Historically, many governments have proposed more labor ﬂexibility, greater trade liberalization, privatization proposals,
ﬁnancial and exchange rate policies reforms and a tax reform. These have produced several eﬀects in the labor market stability.
13Maquilas are certain type of manufacturing companies that operate in a free trade zones. See, Ley de Maquilas y
Contratación Laboral a Tiempo Parcial (1990) Código del Trabajo, Registro Oﬁcial 493, Agosto, Título II (Maquila Law and
Law for Part-time Hiring (1990) "Labor Code", Oﬃcial Journal 493, August, Title II) for the the body of the law.
14These two laws are the: Ley para la Transformación Económica del Ecuador (Law for the Economic Transformation of the
Ecuador) also known as Trole 1 and Ley para la Promoción de la Inversión y Participación ciudadana (Law for the Promotion
of Investment and Citizen Participation) also known as Trole 2.
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employment and to improve the competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms. These reforms contribute
to the creation of, for example, the hourly basis contract, temporal contract and the eventual
employment contracts. This legislation also aﬀected collective bargaining contracts, employee
beneﬁts and changed the regulations for job termination compensations (See Aguiar, 2007).
Another important labor reform that increased labor instability and temporary contracts
was the tercerización (outsourcing). This ﬁgure was initially introduced in the period prior
to the dollarization of the economy in 1998, and in the period between 2003 and to 2005 the
legislation was complemented and expanded. In Ecuador, this speciﬁc form of employing
manpower was abused and had dramatic growth, becoming the customary method of many
companies to hire personnel.
Since 2003, the path of the Ecuadorian economy, has been characterized by tortuous po-
litical instability. However, with controlled inﬂation due to dollarization, a favorable scenario
arose, creating a partial stability that triggered higher investments that foster the industrial
and productive sectors. Moreover, since 2007 the economy has enjoyed high oil prices which
have raised oil exports, generating a greater contribution of the external sector to the GDP.
Also, ﬁscal policy has become really important because of the inability to manipulate mone-
tary policy. In this context, since 2007 the Ecuadorian economy implemented an aggressive
investment policy in education, health and infrastructure. Even though some small crises
have hit the country, the economy has maintained stability. Moreover, the government has
become a key driver of the economy, fostering many productive activities as a complement
to the private sector. This has produced a relatively strong performance of the GDP.
In the context of the labor market, we have seen that in this period, positive legal reforms
have improved job quality. In 2006 a law called Ley de Intermediación Laboral (Labor
Intermediation Act) was enacted. This new regulatory framework produced several changes
in the labor market with the aim of increasing employee beneﬁts and imposing stricter
controls on ﬁrms that use outsourcing as a mean of contracting workers.
The proliferation of legal temporary contracts during the crisis aﬀected the stability of
workers, creating discomfort among the population. As a response, in 2008 the National As-
sembly of Ecuador decided to abolish many types of labor ﬂexibility. This reduced the use
of temporary contract workers. However many companies and employers maintain certain
type of temporary contracts as they are unable to provide stability to all the workers. In this
context, the economic and political history of Ecuador show that growth in labor market
opportunities has been based partially on the ﬂexibility of working contracts.15 For these rea-
sons, the main purpose of this analysis is to examine the impact of diﬀerent characteristics
in determining the probability of obtaining a permanent versus a temporary employment
contract.16 Moreover, we want to determine to what extent these characteristics (demo-
15This labor market structure opposes to vision that employee productivity depends on motivation and stability in a job.
16In the context of the Ecuadorian legislation, ﬁxed term contracts are those made to meet the labor demand of employers or
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graphic, economic activity, region, etc.) impact the probability of have a permanent or
temporary employment contract by gender. Finally, it is important to provide some policy
recommendations, in order to improve the performance of the Ecuadorian labor market.
3.2 Some Stylized Facts of the Ecuadorian Labor Market
This section provides a brief description of the evolution of some important variables of
the Ecuadorian labor market in order to have a better perspective on the performance of
some important indicators. In Figure 1, we can observe the overall employment situation in
Ecuador obtained from the data provided by the INEC. The lines represent the historical
evolution of full employment, underemployment and unemployment. First, we can observe
the behavior of full employment. For the period from 2007 to 2013, we observe a positive
tendency with an increase from 32.5% in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 to 53.27% in the fourth
quarter of 2013 and an overall mean of 43.21% for the whole period.17
Now, in terms of underemployment, in Figure 1 we can observe that on the period 2007
to 2013 the rate had an average of 47.84%, with a declining tendency from 58.69% in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2007 to 44.84% in the fourth quarter of 2013. Therefore, underemployment
is one of the main problems of the Ecuadorian labor market, as many workers are holding
part-time jobs despite desiring full-time jobs. Also, many workers are overqualiﬁed for the
requirements of the jobs that they are performing. Although some reforms in the labor
legislation and the dollarization of the economy have brought some economic stability, the
overall eﬀect on the quality and stability of the work has not had a decisive eﬀect in the
Ecuadorian labor market structure. In Figure 1, we can also see that average unemployment
rate for the period 2007 to 2013 is 6.49% and has a declining tendency from 8.8% in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2007 to 5.03% in the fourth quarter of 2013. From Figure 1, we can observe
that on average for every 100 Ecuadorians of the economically active population, 6.5 of them
could not ﬁnd a job in 2013.
Additionally, it is important to look the unemployment rate for men and women separately
during the period 2007 to 2013. We can observe from Figure 2 that from the ﬁrst quarter
of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2011, women are predominantly the group having higher
unemployment rates with a mean of 4%, compared to men who have a mean of 3.54% during
this period. However, from the second quarter of 2011 to the fourth quarter of 2013, we can
see that men tended to have higher unemployment rates with a mean of 2.65% compared
companies (public or private). The duration of this type of contract has to be at least one year and the duties of the work has
to be stable or permanent in nature. On the other hand, temporary contracts are those made to meet situational demands of
the employers or companies, such as replacing staﬀ who is absent for vacation, sickness, maternity, leave and similar situations.
Temporary contracts can also be used to meet increased demand for production or services on usual activities of the employer,
in which case the contract may not be longer than one hundred eighty continuous or discontinuous days within a period of three
hundred sixty ﬁve days. If the circumstance or requirement of the worker's services is repeated for more than two periods of
one year, the contract will become seasonal contract which is also a temporary structure.
17This percentage represents the number of people with full employment over the economically active population.
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to a mean of 2.4 % of women. The implications of this are important in terms of the eﬀect
that unemployment has on workers and their families. A long period of unemployment may
lead to a decrease in the self-conﬁdence of the unemployed, and may lead them to agree to
take temporary jobs with lower wages and sometime in precarious labor environments.
To have a better perspective of the situation of the Ecuadorian labor market, it is also
important to compare the Ecuadorian unemployment rate with the unemployment rate of
other economies of the Latin American region and important international economies such
as United States and Germany. In Figure 3, we observe that in the last years Ecuador has
consistently achieved low rates of unemployment compared to other countries. In the period
between 2009 and 2013 the unemployment rate of Ecuador is lower than economies such
as United States and Germany, and it is also lower than other Latin American countries
with the exception of Brazil. However, we can observe that in 2013, Ecuador reached an
unemployment rate even lower than Brazil. This supports the idea that Ecuador has im-
proved the situation of its labor market however underemployment and job stability remain
as important challenges.18
As Figure 4 shows, underemployment tends to be higher for men rather than for women.
We also see that there is a decreasing tendency in the underemployment rate and a reduction
in the gap between males and females. The underemployment rate from men rose from
32.97% in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 to 23.23% in the fourth quarter of 2013. We have a
similar situation for women with a reduction of the underemployment rate from 25.72% in
the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 to 20.12% in the fourth quarter of 2013. Furthermore, the overall
mean underemployment rate for men between 2007 and 2013 is 25.45% and it is higher
compared to the overall mean underemployment rate for women which is 22.94%. Therefore,
we observe that in this period, the percentage of Ecuadoreans males employed in the informal
sector or who work on an occasional basis is higher than the Ecuadoreans females in the same
situation.
From Figure 5, we can see that economically active population (PEA) has constantly
risen over period between 2007 and 2013. On the other hand the working age population has
a constant pattern over the years.19 Now, in Figure 6 we see the participation rate, which is
the ratio between the economically active population and the working age population. This
ratio measures the degree of participation of the population in the labor market. We can
observe a decreasing tendency of the participation rate from 62.2% in the ﬁrst quarter of
2007 to 53.5% in the fourth quarter of 2013. The mean of this ratio for the period comprised
between 2007 and 2013 was 57.6%.
In many countries, women are less likely than men to participate in the labor market, i.e.
to be employed or actively seeking work. As Figure 7 shows, in Ecuador the participation
18Higher rates of underutilization of human capital in the Ecuadorian economy may produce complex economic and social
issues, e.g., loss of knowledge and skills, reduction in current and life-long income and job dissatisfaction.
19The economically active population is comprised of persons who worked at least 1 hour in the reference week, or if they did
not work, were previously working (employed) or those that were available for work or were seeking to work (unemployed) and
the working age population comprises all the people that are 10 years old and older.
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rates for females are lower than for males. The participation gap between men and women
has maintained a slightly divergent tendency with a diﬀerence of 14% in the ﬁrst quarter of
2007 to a gap of 18.6% in the fourth quarter of 2013. Moreover, the overall mean of the gap
among men and women is 15.37% for the period between 2007 and 2013.
4 Methodology
The aim of the present analysis is to determine the factors that aﬀect the probability that
a person has temporary employment. In this context, it is necessary to explain the necessary
econometric tools that help us to model people's behavior and choices. With the help of
these models we are going to be able to identify characteristics that inﬂuence the probability
of obtaining a temporary job.20
4.1 Data Sources and Construction of Variables
The data employed for this analysis was obtained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica y Censos (INEC, or National Institute of Statistics and Censuses).21 For the present
analysis the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo (ENEMDU, or National
Survey on Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment for Ecuador) will be used.
The ENEMDU is a household survey conducted quarterly in urban areas. The questionnaire
collects personal (characteristic), labor and income information. In this paper, we included
only people that are 15 to 65 years old, since the Ecuadorian Law states the minimum age
for signing a labor contract is 15 years for all types of work. The age range is also bounded
at 65 years old, as this is minimum age at which employees are able to retire. In the sample
we considered the last observation of an individual that appears in diﬀerent time periods.
The representative nationwide sample is taken from the second quarter of 2007 to the fourth
quarter of 2013. After cleaning the variables and values that are not in the scope of this
study, the ﬁnal sample comprised 428,070 people.
For the present study a set of control variables was selected to take into consideration
personal, institutional, occupational and geographical characteristics of the individuals, to
verify whether these are crucial when obtaining a temporary contract. The selection of inde-
pendent variables is based on previous studies that have been conducted in many countries.
To determine which independent variables best explain the dependent variable, we carried
out a series of sub-models, to avoid having biased statistical results. The identiﬁcation of
20For a more comprehensive description of the models used in this study, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Greene (2012).
21This is a governmental institution that provides reliable survey information for the situtation of the Ecuadorian labor
market.
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temporary employment is based on possible answers to the question about the type of hiring
of the worker and complemented ex-ante with the question about the participation in the
labor force.
4.2 Discrete Choice and Random Utility Model
To understand the basic framework of discrete choice models it is necessary to understand
the idea of random utility models.22 In this context, the utility comparison for an individual
n is not a continuous increase or decrease in utility U, but a discrete comparison. In our
case, we have a binary choice, which is obtaining a temporary job or not, and therefore the
comparison is U(1; 0) to U(0; 1).
We are not able to observe the utilities of people that choose to work under temporary
contracts or other type of contracts. What we are able to observe are the individual choices of
job. So, in this setting, the choice has a probabilistic component. Therefore, the alternatives
i (in case of having a temporary contract) and j (in case of having a non-temporary contract)
for an individual n is given by:
Pn(i) = Pr(Uin > Ujn) and Pn(j) = 1− Pn(i)
As we have individual diﬀerences and observational problems, we cannot assume a deter-
ministic relationship between the choices we observe and the values of U. In this context, it
is important to distinguish between systematic and random components of U. So we have
that:
Uin = Vin + εin and Ujn = Vjn + εjn
In the previous expression Vin represents the systematic or non-random component of
the utility of obtaining a temporary job and εin represents the stochastic component of the
utility of obtaining a temporary job. In the same context, Vjn represents the systematic or
non-random component of the utility of obtaining a non-temporary job and εjn represents
the stochastic component of the utility of obtaining a non-temporary job. Then, we have
that:23
22The treatment of discrete choice modeling, emphasizing the random utility model approach is much like the structure
suggested by McFadden (1981).
23 Let's substitute the last expression into the probability expression: Pn(i) = Pr[Vin + εin ≥ Vjn + εjn]= Pr[εin − εjn ≥
Vjn − Vin]= Pr[εjn − εin ≤ Vin − Vjn]. Now, let εn = εjn − εin. Thus: Pn(i) = Pr[εn ≤ Vin − Vjn]
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Pn(i) = Pr[εn ≤ Vin − Vjn]
A simple interpretation of this expression is that the probability that an individual n
chooses to work under a temporary contract equals the probability that the random ad-
vantage of obtaining a non-temporary job over obtaining a temporary job is less than the
systematic advantage of obtaining a temporary job over obtaining a non-temporary job.
This derivation is very important to understand discrete variable models. It is possible
to intuitively think of the diﬀerence between Vin and Vjn as a weighted combination of
the diﬀerent determinants between working under temporary contract and working under
a non-temporary contract. We can map this onto a real line. For instance, assume that
ε ∼ N(0, σ2). Now map the probability that εn is less than that number:
Vjn − Vin →∞, P r[εn ≤ Vin − Vjn]→ 1
Vin − Vjn → −∞, P r[εn ≤ Vin − Vjn]→ 0
This expression basically express the following relationship:
If Vin  Vjn, Pn(i)→ 1
If Vin  Vjn, Pn(i)→ 0
4.3 Linear Probability Model
In ﬁgure 8(a), we can observe the decision structure of the linear probability model as well
as the Logit and Probit models.24 For this type of models the variable y has a qualitative
meaning with two possible outcomes:
y =
 10 in case of having a temporary contractin case of having a non− temporary contract
So we start with a multiple regression model:
y = β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ βkxk + µ
In this speciﬁcation we have that y is the endogenous variable, and x1, . . . xk are as set
of personal, labor, institutional and regional characteristics that inﬂuence the contractual
24We have based the discussion of Logit and Probit models in the treatment provided in many standard texts such as Greene
(2012) or Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Good discussion in the theory and application of these models s can be found in
Amemiya (1981, 1985), McFadden (1984) and Maddala (1983).
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status of an individual and µ is and identically and independent distributed error. However,
it is important to mention that y has a quantitative meaning in thie linear probability model
structure. In this context, the discrete dependent variable is treated like a metric variable
and therefore we are able to use a common OLS regression methodology.
4.3.1 Parameter interpretation
Since y can take only two values, βj can be interpreted as a marginal eﬀect of xj, therefore
it holds that:
E[y | x] = β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ βkxk
as well as
E[y | x] = P [y = 1 | x] = 1 ∗ P (y = 1 | x) + 0 ∗ (1− P [y = 1 | x])
and we can say that response probability corresponds to conditional expectation of y.
From the equations above we have that:
P [y = 1 | x] = β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ βkxk
Response probability p(x) = P [y = 1 | x] is a linear function of xj and the same applies
to P [y = 0 | x] = 1 = P [y = 1 | x]. Therefore, we have that βj measures the ceteris paribus
change of the response probability based on a one-unit change of xj:
∆P [y = 1 | x] = βj∆xj
In our case we can say that an additional unit in one of the characteristics has a marginal
impact βj on the probability of working under temporary employment, holding everything
else constant.
4.3.2 Problems
When applying OLS, p(x) can take on values beyond the interval of [0, 1] and therefore the
interpretation as probability is implausible.25 Also, this model assumes identical increases
of probability when exogenous variables increase, independent of the actual level. Moreover,
there are also problems of heteroscedasticity and µi can take only two values: −x′iβ and
1− x′iβ:
E[µi] = P (1− x′iβ) + (1− P )(−x′iβ) = 0
25Furthermore, we have that linearity is implausible especially at the margins of realizations.
14
V ar[µi] = P (1− x′iβ)2 + (1− P )(−x′iβ)2
V ar[µi] = P (1− P ) = (x′iβ)(1− x′iβ)
βj are unbiased but standard errors are incorrect and therefore t-statistics and F-statistics
are not applicable. Consequently, we need to employ other types of models that take into
accounts these nonlinearities.
4.4 Logit Model
We have already identiﬁed the two main groups of workers (temporary and non-temporary),
therefore we need to apply a methodology that reveals the probability of being a temporary
employee based in some underlying characteristics. To assess the probability of having a
temporary job we are going to use a Logit regression model.26 This is a type of the binary
response model family that help us to correct some of the problems of the linear probability










and Λ(.) is the logistic distribution function and x
′
i are the vector of characteristics that
inﬂuence the contractual status of an individual. Therefore, it holds that:








[yi − Λ(x′iβ)]xi = 0
4.4.1 Marginal Eﬀects
In this model, estimated coeﬃcients do not reﬂect marginal eﬀects on probability as in
the linear probability model. Thus, it is useful to deﬁne the marginal eﬀect of a change of a








26For further discussion see Amemiya (1981, 1985), McFadden (1984) and Maddala (1983).
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which depends on the value of the vector of characteristics xi, like in all non-linear models.
If we want to be more speciﬁc we can say that marginal eﬀects in the Logit model can easily
be deﬁned with the help of the coeﬃcients as:
∂pi
∂xij
= pi(1− pi)βj with p = Λi = Λ(x′iβ)
For a rough estimate the following deﬁnition is helpful to specify that pi = y¯, that is to
say y¯(1− y¯)βˆj.
4.4.2 Odds Ratio
Often the eﬀects of the reggresors are determined by the so-called odds ratio. The odds
ratio describes the relative risk of probability for y = 1 and y = 0. We can say that the
















Consequently, the odds ratio is a relative measures of the eﬀect of one of the character-
istics on the probability of obtaining a temporary versus non temporary contract, holding
everything else constant.
4.5 Probit Model
To quantify the eﬀect of the set of characteristics that inﬂuence the probability of having
a temporary employment, a Probit model is also speciﬁed. This is another type of binary






and Φ(z) is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution with the density







i are the vector of characteristics that inﬂuence the
contractual status of an individual. Again, in order to ﬁnd the desired parameters we need
to obtain the ﬁrst order condition of the Probit-Maximum-Likelihood-Estimator:
N∑
i=1
wi[yi − Φ(x′iβ)]xi = 0









varies over the range of observations.
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4.5.1 Marginal Eﬀects
With this type of model we can specify the marginal eﬀect of a change of a regressor on






4.6 Model Choice and Model Comparison
The speciﬁcations aforementioned are going be estimated in order to compare the three
models and decide which one is the best ﬁt to assess the eﬀect of the set of characteristics
that inﬂuence the probability of having a temporary employment.There are usually only few
diﬀerences between logit and probit models in empirical applications.The largest diﬀerences
occur at the margins of the distribution (near probabilities of 0 or 1) but these are not
crucial with respect to average marginal eﬀects of a sample. Model comparison is done
with confrontation of log-likelihoods and therefore the models produce considerably diﬀerent
coeﬃcients βˆ. Additionally, we are going to the Akaike Information Criterion, or AIC, given
by Sakamoto, Ishiguro, and Kitagawa (1987) and the Bayes Information Criterion, or BIC,
given by Schwarz (1978). In both measures, smaller values are preferred.
Also, it is important to establish the diﬀerences among the goodness of ﬁt. Linear models





by minimizing the squared residuals a maximization of goodness of ﬁt is realized. However,
using R2 is diﬃcult in probit and logit models because computing µˆi = y
∗
i − yˆ∗i is not possible
as y∗i cannot be observed. We have that maximum likelihood method has a diﬀerent target
function than OLS, which is maximizing the likelihood function rather than minimizing the
sum of squared residuals. Therefore a good approach to measure the goodness of ﬁt in this
type of models is McFadden's R2MF , which draws on the value of the log-likelihood function.
A standardization is necessary since the absolute value of the log-likelihood is not meaningful:
R2MF = 1− LN (βˆ)LN (y)
R2MF = 1−
∑
i{yi ln pˆi + (1− yi) ln(1− pˆi)}
N [y¯ ln y¯ + (1− y¯) ln(1− y¯)
We have that LN(βˆ) is the value of the log-likelihood function with ML-estimators of the
respective model and LN(y) is the log-likelihood function of the model with only an intercept
(β = 0). Additionally, we are going to use other R-squared measures, such as the R-squared
of Cragg-Uhler-Nagelkerke, in order to compare the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
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4.7 Fairlie's Method of Decomposition
To implement this methodology, it is necessary to initially identify the two subsets of
workers (temporary and non-temporary). After that we are able to execute various estima-
tion procedures to reveal the diﬀerences in the probability of obtaining a temporary contract
between men and women. To measure the probability of having temporary employment it
is appropriate to estimate a Logit/Probit model for all employed individuals. Subsequently,
an evaluation of the model is executed by adding interaction terms. This speciﬁcation in-
troduces new variables to the previous equation by multiplying each of the factors by the
female dummy. After that, we apply the Fairlie decomposition technique for the logit/probit
model in order to identify and quantify the contributions of gender diﬀerences.
Now, let's start by deﬁning the initial models as:
P (Yi = 1) = F (β0 +Xiβ1 + Aiβ2 +Biβ3 + µ)
Yi - is a dichotomous variable that has a value of 1 if the employment is temporary or 0
if the employment is permanent.
β0, β1, β2, β3  vectors of coeﬃcients
Xi - set of personal and family characteristics:
p Sex (Female, Male) [Reference category: Female]
p Age (Ranges:15-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65) [Reference category: 36-45]
p Education (None, Primary, Secondary, Higher non-university, University, Gradu-
ate) [Reference category: University]
p Race (Indigenous, White, Black-Afro, Mestizo, Other, Montubio) [Reference cat-
egory: Mestizo]
p Marital Status (Married, Divorced/Separated, Single) [Reference category: Mar-
ried]
Ai - set of occupational characteristics:
p Category of Occupation (Government employee, Private employee, Outsourced,
Journeyman, Domestic employee) [Reference category: Government employee]
p Duration in a company (Less than one year, More than one year) [Reference
category: Less than one year]
p Size of company (Less than 100 employees, More than 100 employees) [Reference
category: Less than 100 employees]
p Working hours (Part time, Full time) [Reference category: Full time]
18
Bi - set of institutional and regional characteristics
p Government Cash Transfer (Yes, No) [Reference category: No]
p Regions (Sierra-Highlands, Coast, Amazon) [Reference category: Sierra-Highlands]
p Area (Urban, Rural) [Reference category: Urban]
The subsequent step is to estimate the aforementioned model speciﬁcation with additional
interaction terms. This new speciﬁcation introduces additional variables to the previous
equation. We are going to generate new terms by multiplying all variables in the previous
speciﬁcation by the dummy for sex Df (1 for female, 0 for male). Thus, we have the
speciﬁcation as:
P (Yi = 1) = F (β0 +Xiβ1 + Aiβ2 +Biβ3 +DfXiβ4 +DfAiβ6 +DfBiβ7 + µ)
With this speciﬁcation, we are able to observe the eﬀects of the Sex dummy in the diﬀerent
factors that have been included in the regression equation.
To examine the gender diﬀerentials, a useful method is the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
method. The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) methodology helps decompose the mean
diﬀerences in some outcome variables between two groups. This decomposition permits us to
identify a part which is due to diﬀerences in observable characteristics (explained diﬀerential)
and another part which is due to diﬀerences in unobservable characteristics (unexplained
diﬀerential). However, this technique of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) involves coeﬃcient
estimates from linear regressions only and it is not possible to apply in this case, as our
outcome variable is binary. As we a have a logit/probit regression model with a binary
dependent variable, it is necessary to employ another type of methodology. Fairlie (1999,
2005) and Yun (2004) have proposed useful methodologies that help to obtain a detailed
decomposition when we are dealing with limited dependent variable models. Therefore,
in the present analysis, Fairlie's method of decomposing for logit/probit models is used to
obtain the diﬀerences among male and female. By applying this methodology, it is possible
to disentangle the gender diﬀerences of temporary versus permanent employment. The
speciﬁcation of the Fairlie decomposition is given by:

























F - cumulative distribution function from logistic distribution (logit model) or standard
normal distribution (probit model)
X - row vector of independent variables
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β - vector of coeﬃcient estimates for Sex (Male, Female).
4.8 Selection Bias in Binary Choice Models
In the present study, we want to know how several characteristics aﬀect the likelihood of
success of obtaining a temporary contract. The main problem is that information about the
contractual situations is only available for the people who have an employment.
In order to solve this selection problem,27 we are going to ﬁrst use a multinomial logit
model, which takes into consideration not only the people who are working, but also the
people who are not working. Also a useful tool, when we are dealing with selection, is the
Heckman model (see Heckman, 1979). However, this type of model has the limitation that
the outcome equation should involve a continuous dependent variable. In the present study,
we are interested in estimating an outcome equation that involves a dichotomous dependent
variable. In this context, we deal with a probit selection equation and a probit outcome
equation. Therefore, a bivariate probit model framework is an appropriate methodology in
this case.
4.8.1 Multinomial Logit
In ﬁgure 8(b), we can observe the decision structure of the multinomial logit model.28 In
this case we infer that the decision of the person n that choose a labor status alternative j
is described by the utility equation,
Unj = Vnj + µnj
The systematic component of the utility function is given as,
Vnj = znγj
Therefore,
Unj = znγj + µnj
In the previous equation, γj is a vector of alternative-speciﬁc parameters. So, in this
type of speciﬁcation the eﬀect of the regressors will vary across all the labor status choices.
27There is a variety of literature on models from selected samples. Good treatments are provided by Maddala (1983) and
Gouri'eroux (2000), Amemiya(1984, 1985) and Greene (2012).
28Amemiya (1981, 1985), Maddala (1983), Greene (2012), Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (1986) provide theory
and applications to understand the structure of multinomial models.
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As in previous models this can be estimated using a log likelihood estimation process.
4.8.2 Bivariate Probit
In this type of model, we have a structure which is composed of two separate probit
models with correlated disturbances.29 This model, has an structure similar to the seemingly
unrelated regression models (SUR).30
In this context, we have two dichotomous dependent variables. By applying this type of
methodology we are basically trying to model two interrelated decisions of a person. In the
ﬁrst stage we are interested in modeling if a person participates or not in the labor market
and in the second stage we are interested in whether the person chooses a temporary contract
or not. Moreover, we employ this type of model because we assume that the two decisions
are interrelated. In ﬁgure 8(c), we can observe the decision structure of the bivariate probit
model. Thus, the model is given by
y∗1 = x1β1 + µ1
y∗2 = x2β2 + µ2
where the expressions y∗1 and y
∗
2 are unobservable latent variables that are linked to the
binary dependent variables y1 and y2 by
y1 =
1 if y∗1 > 00 if y∗1 ≤ 0 and y2 =
1 if y∗2 > 00 if y∗2 ≤ 0
In this framework, it is important to note that if the errors are independent among the
two probit models, then it is possible to estimate these models separately. However, in our
case, we expect to have a covariance diﬀerent from zero and therefore we will have that
µ1i = ηi + 1i
29For further discussion of this model see Greene (2012) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
30For a discussion of Seemingly Unrelated Regression models (SUR) see chapter 10 of Greene (2012).
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µ2i = ηi + 2i
This means that in each of the models the error is composed of an element i exclusive
to that model and joint component ηi. As we are using a bivariate probit speciﬁcation we
assume that µji, ji and ηi for j = 1, 2, are normally distributed. This implies that µji is
inﬂuenced partially by ηi, which indicates that µ1i and µ2i are correlated. In this context,
we want to estimate the joint probability of y1i and y2i.31 So
P (y1i = 1) = P (µ1i > −x′1iβ)
= P (1i + ηi > −x′1iβ)
and
P (y2i = 1) = P (µ2i > −x′2iβ2)
= P (2i + ηi > −x′2iβ2)
The joint probability of several random variables is the product of their marginal prob-
abilities, if these random variables are independent. However, in our case the two random
variables are not independent and therefore we need to ﬁnd the joint probabilities for non-
independent events. Thus,
P (y1 = 1, y2 = 1) = P (y1 = 1|y2 = 1)× P (y2 = 1)
= P (y1 = 1)× P (y2 = 1|y1 = 1)
In order to obtain this probability we will use a bivariate normal distribution.32 For the
estimation of the bivariate probit model we are going to assume that the errors are i.i.d.
following a standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρ (which can be also
expressed as µ1, µ2 ∼ φ2(0, 0, 1, 1, ρ)).33
This methodological structure helps us to obtain the necessary probabilities, as for exam-
ple, the probability of going to the labor market and having a temporary employment,
31In the case in which ρ = 0, we can estimate independently the two probit equations and obtain consistent results. But,
when we have a ρ 6= 0, it is better to estimate the two equation jointly, as it is more eﬃcient.
32











1−ρ2 )], where the correlation
coeﬃcient ρ represents the degree of association of the errors µ1 and µ2. Their joint cdf is given






33 Consequently, E[µ1|x1, x2] = E[µ2|x1, x2] = 0;Cov[µ1|x1, x2] = Cov[µ2|x1, x2] = 0;Cov[µ1, µ2|x1, x2] = ρ
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−∞ φ2(x1β1, x2β2; ρ)dµ1dµ2
= Φ(x1β1, x2β2; ρ)
Similarly as in the previous models, in order to ﬁnd the desired parameter, we need to
obtain the Maximum-Likelihood-Estimator. In the case of the bivariate probit model, the
log-likelihood is a sum across the four possible combinations of y1 and y2 multiplied by their





{y1iy2iΦ2(x1β1, x2β2; ρ) + y1i(1− y2i)ln[Φ(x1β1)− Φ2(x1β1, x2β2; ρ)]
+(1− y1i)y2iln[Φ(x2β2)− Φ2(x1β1, x2β2; ρ)
+(1− y1i)(1− y2i)ln[1− Φ(x1β1)− Φ(x2β2)− Φ2(x1β1, x2β2; ρ)]
4.8.3 Marginal Eﬀects
Again, as in previous models, in the bivariate probit case, it is possible to obtain the
marginal eﬀect of a change of a regressor. However, in the case of a bivariate probit model,
we are interested in the conditional mean function,
E[y1|y2 = 1] = P (y1 = 1|y2 = 1) = P (y1=1,y2=1)P (y2=1)
= Φ2(x1β1,x2β2;ρ)
Φ(x2β2)
And then we can take the derivative of this expression with respect to any of the regressors
in order to get the marginal eﬀects.
5 Results of the model
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
It is important to perform an exploratory analysis to determine the structure and quality
of the database. Here, we present the ﬁnal results of the main variables used for the estima-
tion process. We start the analysis by exploring the main features of the variables employed
in the study. This will provide a good insight into the situation of the Ecuadorian labor
market. Several tables are presented in order to show the distributional characteristics, as
well as, the structure of important variables that aﬀect a person's contractual situation. By
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examining these descriptive statistics, we are able to identify some of the features related
to the probability of having a temporary versus other type of contractual situations. Before
we start the analysis we need to deﬁne some important categories that are going to be used.
The category other refers to people who do not deﬁne their type of contract in the survey,
however, they are working in the formal sector, informal sector or in a non-classiﬁed activity.
The category non-working refers to anyone who does not have a job, have actively looked for
a job in the past weeks, and are currently available for work. On the other hand, out of the
labor force refers to anyone who is not classiﬁed by the National Institute of Statistics and
Census (INEC) as members of the labor force. This category is largely comprised of several
segments of the population, such as young (students), elderly (retired), homemakers, etc. It
also includes others who are either unwilling or unable to engage in productive activities.
5.1.1 Personal Characteristics
In this subset of characteristics, the following variables are included: Sex, Age, Marital
Status, Education and Race.
In Table 1, it is observable that among men, temporary employment represents 31.52%
and is the most common way of contractual situation. In the case of women, The category
out of the labor force represents 46.99% and is the most common contractual situation.
Moreover, men tend to have more temporary contracts (31.52%) than permanent contracts
(17.06%). In the case of women, we can see that they tend to be more concentrated in
permanent jobs (11.80%) compared to temporary jobs (11.72%). However, women tend to
have higher non-working contractual situation compared to men with 52.35% versus 47.65%
for men. Also, it is important to note that out of the labor force male population (26.06)
is signiﬁcantly lower than out of the labor force female population (73.94%). From Table 1,
we can also observe that temporary contracts are concentrated more among males (71.82%)
in relation to females (28.18%).
From Table 2, we see that among people in the age range 15-25, out of the labor force
is the most common contractual condition with 51.32%. In the age range 26-35 temporary
employment is the predominant contractual condition with 28.78% and in the age range
36-45 (36%), 46-55 (40.59%) and 56+ (41.97%), we see that other is the predominant
contractual condition. Now, if we focus on temporary and permanent contracts, we can
see that permanent contracts are concentrated among the age ranges of 26-35 and 36-45,
with 27.81% and 24.50%, respectively. Conversely, we can see that temporary employment
is concentrated more among the age groups of 15-25 and 26-35 with 34.15% and 26.57%,
correspondingly. It is important to note that non-working (51.47%) and out of the labor
force (52.96%) categories are mainly concentrated in the age range 15-25.
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Analyzing the marital status of the individuals, we can infer that among married and
separated people, there are a concentration of other contractual situation with 33.99% and
35.69%, respectively. Among single persons the most common contractual situation is out of
the labor force with 42.75%. Furthermore, permanent contracts are concentrated among the
people who are married, with a share of 60.24%. A similar situation is observed for temporary
contracts, as married people represent 49.75% and single people represent 40.58%.
Examining Table 4, it is observable that people with none, basic and secondary tend to
be concentrated among other and out of the labor force. On the other hand, people with
higher no university, university and graduate studies tend to have a permanent contractual
condition with 35.94%, 32.40% and 65.38%, correspondingly. Moreover, it is also important
to mention that among the people who have a permanent contract, there is tendency to
have a university education (39.02%). Among the people with temporary contracts, there is
a concentration of people that have basic and secondary education, at 47.04% and 33.51%,
respectively.
Variables such as race are considered very important for explaining temporary contract
status. It is observable from Table 5 that Indigenous populationtend tend to be concentrated
in other as their contractual situation. All the other racial groups tend to be concentrated
in out of the labor force and other as their contractual situation. We can see from table 5
that only 6.23% of the Indigenous people have a permanent employment and 18.42% have
temporary employment. Mestizos tend to have more temporary (21.85%) than permanent
(15.69%) contracts. We have a similar situation for White people, with 15.04% having
permanent contracts versus 21.13% having temporary contracts. Montubio people tend to
have more temporary contracts than permanent contracts. In the case of Black people we
can observe that they tend to have more temporary contracts with 27.5% compared to 8.8%
that have permanent jobs. Another important feature is that some people tend to deﬁne
themselves as other in terms of their race. This category, which represents 53.65% of the
total, is characterized by a high heterogeneity of races. Moreover, we can observe from Table
5 that an important percentage of all people from all races are out of the labor force.
5.1.2 Occupational Characteristics
From Table 6 we can observe that private sector and self-employment are the most com-
mon sectors where people tend to work with 29.01% and 28.33%. In terms of temporary and
permanent employment, it is observable from table 6 that government employees as well as
private employees tend to have permanent contracts with 71.83% and 36.17%, respectively.
In contrast, outsourced and journeyman employees tend to have temporary employments
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with 68.02% and 95.24%, correspondingly. Table 6 also shows that patrono,34 self-employed
and unpaid workers workers, tend be highly concentrated in other category with 99.20%,
98.79% and 99.60%, respectively. Furthermore, domestic employees tend to have tempo-
rary contracts (59.14%) and many people in the non-working group are private employees
(56.18%).
By analyzing the years of career services in Table 7, we can see that permanent contracts
are less concentrated in the people that have an experience of less than one year with 14.67%.
In the case of temporary contracts the diﬀerence is not as big as in the population with
permanent employment, as we can see that people with experience of more than one year
represent 64.34%. Now, if we observe the category other, we see that the people in this
group tend to be concentrated in more than one year of experience with 87.75%. The non-
working and out of the labor force groups reported in Table 7 did not provide information
about this question.
In Table 8, we observe that size of the company is an inﬂuential characteristic. We see
that companies with more than 100 employees (large companies) tend to oﬀer permanent
contracts (54.36%). A diﬀerent situation is observable for people that work in companies
with less than 100 employees (small companies), as this group represent the 82.51% of the
total population of employees that works on temporary jobs. Additionally, we can see from
Table 8 that people that work under other contractual status tend to be people working
in companies with less than 100 employees (99.96%).
By analyzing working hours in Table 9, we can see that permanent contracts are less
concentrated in the people who have a part time employment (6.46%). In the case of tem-
porary contracts, we can observe a similar situation, as people who work part time represent
only the 21.58%. Now, if we observe the category other, people in this group tend to be
concentrated full time employment with 62.28%. The non-working and out of the labor force
groups reported in the table did not provide information about this question.
5.1.3 Institutional and Regional Characteristics
We also have to analyze if a cash transfer from the government inﬂuences the probability
of having a temporary contract. If we look the population under permanent contracts, we
see that the majority (97.73%) do not receive the beneﬁt of the government cash transfer. A
similar situation is true for the people with temporary contracts (93.51%). Moreover, we can
see that people who are receiving cash transfer beneﬁts are concentrated among the groups
other and out of the labor, at 33.49% and 49.42%, respectively.
34Patrono is a particular type of employer that oﬀers a private service job to a worker, under his authority, for a fee or
remuneration.
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We also take into consideration regional diﬀerence as a variable that could have an im-
portant inﬂuence in the probability of having a temporary contract. From Table 11 we
can observe that permanent contracts are concentrated in the Sierra/Highlands area with
60.68%. In relation to temporary contracts, we can see that Coast area is where there is more
concentration of this type of contract with 50.63%. People out of the labor force are almost
equally divided among the Sierra/Highlands and Coast with 46.95% and 48.23%. Also, in
the Amazon area the other contractual situation is the most common status with 33.32%.
Finally, we analyze the diﬀerence between rural and urban areas as a determinant of the
probability of having a temporary contract. In Table 12 we see that permanent contracts
are concentrated in urban areas with 83.2%. Temporary contracts are more equally divided
among rural (43.66%) and urban (56.34%) areas. Other is also divided among rural and
urban areas with 45.03% and 54.97%. Non-working and out of the labor force populations
are mainly concentrated in urban areas, at 77.67% and 63.03%, respectively.
5.2 Results of the Estimated Models
5.2.1 Model Comparison and Logit Speciﬁcation
In regression Table 13, we can observe the three models that have been used to estimate
the probability of a worker to have a temporary employment. The results show that the
majority of the variables included are statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the three models
present similar directions of the eﬀects. However, as it has been explained in the methodology
section, the linear probability model generates some statistical problems and therefore is not
the best ﬁt for this type of data.35 In relation to the logit and probit models, the results
are quite similar and we have analyzed both models under various statistical criterions,36
in order to select the appropriate model. Additionally, each variable has been examined to
decide the most appropriate regressors that have to be included in the model. Based in these
procedures we have concluded that the logit model is the most accurate speciﬁcation for the
estimation of the probability of having a temporary contract. This is also in concordance
with many applied studies that have performed similar methodologies.
The logit model speciﬁcation in Table 14 takes into consideration only the people who
are in the labor market and are employed. This model shows signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
probability of having a temporary versus a permanent contract. Among the most important
variables that inﬂuence this probability we have personal characteristics such as sex, age,
marital status, level of education, race, labor characteristics such as category of occupation,
35In the linear probability model, the standard errors are not precise and therefore are not useful in testing accurately the
signiﬁcance of the parameter estimates.
36The criterions used are: R2MF , R
2
snell and cox, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
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duration in a company, size of a company, working hours, institutional characteristics such
as government cash transfers and geographical characteristics such as geographic region and
area.
According to the model, the probability of being a temporary employee is higher for males
than for females. Being a young person (between 15 and 35 years of age) who has a low
level of education increases the probability of having a temporary contract. Not having a
spouse increases the possibility of temporary employment. Being an indigenous person who
receives the government cash transfer increases the likelihood for temporary contracts. Being
an outsourced or journeyman employee as well as working part time increases the chances
of having temporary employment. Working more than one year in a large company (more
than 100 employees) decreases the possibility of obtaining a temporary contract. Living in a
rural area in the Coast or Amazon region increases the probability of being in a temporary
job.
It was observable from Table 13 that all the variables are statistically signiﬁcant at the
95% conﬁdence level. However, it should be noted that certain categories of these these
variables are not statistically signiﬁcant. To check if the model is globally meaningful, we
have performed the logarithm of likelihood ratio test, which gives a p-value that is close
to zero, indicating that the full model with all the covariates improves the ﬁt signiﬁcantly
compared with a model without any predictor. Moreover, it is important to mention that
the result are highly plausible, based in the reality of the Ecuadorian labor market structure,
as we will explain later. Finally, we have also analyzed various R-squared measures (The R
Square of Cragg-Uhler-Nagelkerke and McFaddens R square) which have values of 0.52 and
0.36, respectively, indicating that 52% and 36% of the variation in the dependent variable
is explained by the variables included in the model. The econometric theory suggests that
in this type of models, these obtained R square values represent a good ﬁt of the estimated
model.
For the interpretation of the results, we have selected the reference category to be a
woman, with an age between 36 and 45 years old and with university education. This woman
is married or cohabitating and working in an institution more than one year. Moreover, she
is a government employee, with full-time job in an institution with more than 100 workers.
Also, this woman does not receive a government cash transfer and lives in an urban area
in the Sierra region. Results of the regression suggest that being a Male versus being a
Female increase the odds of having a temporary contract by a factor of 1.19. This shows an
interesting feature of the Ecuadorian labor market in which women have a higher probability
of job stability. Also, people in the age range between 15 to 25 years and 26 to 35 years have
high odds of having a permanent contract by a factor of 1.42 and 1.26, respectively, compared
to people in the age range between 36 to 45 years. This could be because young people face
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particular diﬃculties in entering the labor market and tend to be hired under temporary
contracts as they are less experienced or skilled. However, as the worker becomes older, she
becomes more qualiﬁed and knowledgeable and therefore the chance of having a temporary
employment decreases. From regression Table 14, we can infer that divorced/separated or
single people tend to have a higher probability of having a temporary contract compared
to people that are married by a factor of 1.24 and 1.18, respectively. Also, if an individual
has not attained any education or has only basic or secondary education the odds of having
a temporary versus permanent employment increases by a factor of 2.86, 2.09 and 1.39,
correspondingly. This shows that people employees with less investment in human capital
tend to increase the probability of become a temporary worker.
Another important feature of the model is that if a person is belonging to the indigenous
racial subset, the odds of having a temporary versus permanent contract increases by a factor
of 1.31. As well, it is important to mention that an individual that works as an outsourced
or journeyman has a positive eﬀect in the odds of having a temporary versus permanent
contract by factors of 3.29 and 38.93, respectively. All these features could be explained by
the fact that temporary employment is very likely to be present in economic sectors in which
simple and basic tasks are performed, such as those required by agricultural crops, livestock
breeding, ﬁshing, hunting, construction industry and therefore only require the use of hand
tools and often considerable physical eﬀort.
Table 14 also shows that if a person is working in an institution more than one year
the odds of having a temporary versus permanent employment contract is decreased by
a factor of 0.23. As we mentioned before, people that have gained experience and have
been working in an institution for a while tend to have higher stability and therefore the
likelihood of a having a permanent contract is higher. Moreover, if an individual has a
part-time job the odds of having a temporary versus permanent contract increases and by
a factor of 2.49 and if works within an institution with more than 100 workers the odds of
having a temporary employment decreases by a factor of 0.44. This might be because large
institutions and companies often tend to oﬀer permanent contracts in comparison to small
and middle institutions or companies that want to minimize cost and try to hire workers
under temporary contracts. Furthermore, it is reasonable that people that tend to work
full-time are more likely to have a permanent contract in comparison to the people that have
only part-time jobs. An additional interesting feature of this model is that a person who
receives the government cash transfer also has higher odds of having a temporary versus
permanent employment by a factor of 1.67. The reason is that people who receive this cash
transfer are mainly poor and therefore are usually working in sectors in which there is lack
of job stability. Finally, it is important to mention that if a person lives in the Coast or the
Amazon region as well as in a rural area, the odds of having a temporary versus permanent
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contract decreases by a factor of 1.92, 1.43 and 1.29 respectively. This shows the disparities
in the quality of employment among the regions of Ecuador.
5.2.2 Logit Model with Sex Interaction Terms
In this analysis, we use a logistic regression with interaction terms for female. The aim of
estimating a model with interaction terms is to measure the eﬀect of being a female in all the
other personal, labor, institutional and regional characteristics that aﬀect the probability of
having a temporary contract.
The results in Table 15 are consistent with the results obtained in the previous logit
speciﬁcation without interaction terms. We observe that according to the logit model with
interaction terms, the probability of being a temporary employee remains higher for males
compared to females and the size of the eﬀect is higher. Also, it is observable from Table
15 that factors such as being single, having secondary education, being in the racial group
other, work in the government or being a domestic employee, the length in a company, the
size of a company, working part time and living in a rural area have diﬀerent eﬀects for men
and women in the probability of obtaining a temporary employment.
5.2.3 Fairlie Decomposition
Subsequently, we performed a Fairlie detailed decomposition. With this method we de-
composed the diﬀerentials in the probability of having a temporary contract between men
and women and see the contributions of each of the personal, labor, institutional and regional
characteristics in explaining the gender diﬀerence. From the results of the decomposition in
Table 16, we can observe that our model measures a total diﬀerence of 0.15 and a gender
diﬀerence of 0.082. This tell us that the decomposition performed show that 8.2% of the
gender gap in temporary employment is explained by all of the included characteristics in
the model. From the results we see that category of occupation account for 7.48% of the
men/women gap in the probability of having a temporary contract. Also, one of the largest
factors contributing to this gender diﬀerence is education (2.19%). Other signiﬁcant factors
that contribute to explain the gender diﬀerences are duration in a company (-1.65%), work-
ing hours (-1.08%), size of the company (0.83%) as well as living in a rural or urban area
(0.54%). Also, region (Highlands, Coast or Amazon) and government cash transfers explain
0.48% and -0.39% of the men/women gap in the probability of having a temporary employ-
ment, correspondingly. Marital status explains a small portion of the gender gap (-0.28%)
and race have almost no inﬂuence in explaining the gender gap (0.02%).
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5.2.4 Multinomial Logit
In order to take into consideration heterogeneity and selection issues, we have estimated
a multinomial logit model for males and females. The results in Table 17 show that women
are more likely to have permanent employment (compared to temporary employment) when
they are older (more than 35 years old), and have a higher educational attainment (Graduate
studies). These are the only two factors that are statistically signiﬁcant for this category.
Now, if we look at other category, females have higher probability of working under this
type of contracts (compared to working under temporary contracts) when they are older
(more than 35 years old), have less educational attainment (None, Basic, Secondary), are
Indigenous or Montubio and when they live in rural areas. From table 17, we can also
observe that women have higher possibility to be in the not-working category (compared to
having a temporary employment) when they are younger, however the eﬀect diminishes and
it is statistically signiﬁcant for all age groups, except the age range between 56 and 65 years
old. Also, women have a higher possibility to be in the not-working category if they have
secondary education and if the live the Coast region of the country. Finally, females are
more likely to be out of the labor force (compared to working under temporary contracts)
when they are in the ages groups 15-25, 26-35 and 56-65, with a higher impact when they
are older. This shows the fact that in the out of the labor force group there are young people
studying or voluntarily not working and older people leaving the labor force. Furthermore,
women are more likely to be out of the labor force if they have less educational attainment
(None, Basic, Secondary), are White, Other or Montubio, receive the government cash
transfer, live in the Coast and Amazon region and if they live in a rural area.
Table 18 shows the results of the multinomial regression for males, which produced slightly
diﬀerent results than the previous regression for women. The results in Table 18 indicate that
men are more likely to have permanent employment (compared to temporary employment)
when they are older (more than 35 years old), and have a higher educational attainment
(Higher non-University and Graduate studies). As before, these are the only two factors
that are statistically signiﬁcant for this category of occupation. Now, if we look at the
Other category, males have higher probability of working under this type of contracts
(compared to working under temporary contracts) when they are older (more than 35 years
old), are Indigenous or Montubio, when they receive the government cash transfer and when
they live in the Amazon region. Also, from Table 18, we can see that men have a higher
possibility to be in the not working category (compared to having a temporary employment)
when they are in the age ranges 15-25, 26-35 and 56-65, are separated or single and when
they are White or Montubio. Lastly, males are more likely to be out of the labor force
(compared to working under temporary contracts) when they are in the ages groups 15-25,
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26-35 and 56-65, again with a higher impact when they are older. Moreover, men are more
likely to be out of the labor force if they are separated or single, are Indigenous, White,
Other or Montubio and if they receive the government cash transfer.
5.2.5 Bivariate Probit
The bivariate probit model assumes that people make two sequential decisions. The ﬁrst
is whether to participate in the labor market (work) or not and the second is which type
of contract to accept. From Table 19, we can see the results of the likelihood ratio test
which rejects the null hypothesis that ρ = 0 at the 1% level. This provides evidence in favor
of joint normality between the error terms from the initial participation decision and the
subsequent contractual decisions, thereby suggesting that the bivariate probit may be an
appropriate speciﬁcation. In Table 19, the bivariate probit coeﬃcients represent the eﬀect
of several characteristics on the decision to participate in the labor market or not and the
decision of working under a temporary or non-temporary contract, respectively. We can
observe that men tend to have higher probability to participate and work under temporary
contracts compared to women. Being in the age ranges 15-25, 26-35 and 56-65, decreases the
possibility of participation in the labor force, and people in the age ranges 15-25 and 26-35
have lower possibilities to have a temporary contract. Therefore, we can see that younger
people tend to participate less in the labor force and if they participate, they tend to have
higher probability to work under temporary basis.
As Table 19 shows, separated and single people tend to have lower probability to par-
ticipate in the labor force and if they participate they have higher probability to obtain a
temporary employment. People with lower educational attainment (None, Basic) and with
very high educational attainment (Graduate) are more likely to participate in the labor force.
However, people with lower education (None, Basic and Secondary) are more likely to have
a temporary job. This shows that the labor market demands workers with low skills to
perform physical or basic jobs in sectors such as agriculture, mining or ﬁshery and people
with high skills to perform more intellectual activities in sectors such as services. However,
people who perform these low-skilled jobs are prone to obtain a temporary job. We also
observe from Table 19 that people who identify themselves as White have lower probability
of participation and people who identify themselves as Indigenous or Other have higher
probability to work under temporary contracts. People who are private, outsourced, jour-
neyman and domestic employee are less likely to participate, and if they participate the
have higher probability to have a temporary employment. As expected, people receiving
Government cash transfers have lower probability of participation and higher probability of
having a temporary job. Living in the Coast region decreases the probability to participate
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and increases the likelihood of obtaining a temporary employment. Similarly, people living
in the Amazon region are more likely to work under temporary contract and people living
in a rural area are more likely to participate however people in this area tend to have higher
probability to obtain a temporary job.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Using data from the Survey of Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment from
the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Ecuador and the application of several
econometric models, the present analysis aims to contribute to the understanding of some
characteristics that inﬂuence the probability of obtaining a temporary employment in the
Ecuadorian labor market. It is important to mention that the results of all the models, used
to explain the determinants of temporary employment, show similar and consistent results.
My analysis indicates that temporary employment in Ecuador is a phenomenon associated
with the characteristics of the person, the geographical region where an individual lives and
other institutional and occupational characteristics. Recalling the main results, being male
tends to increase the probability to be a temporary employee in the Ecuadorian labor market.
Factors such as being young, have a low educational attainment and certain marital status
and race categories are the personal characteristics that increase the likelihood of obtaining
a temporary employment contract. Occupational features such as being an outsourced or
journeyman worker, working in an institution less than one year and having a part-time job
inﬂuence positively the odds of obtaining a temporary contract. Additional, institutional
characteristics such as the beneﬁts from the Government cash transfers and regional char-
acteristics such as living in a rural area or in the Coast and Amazon region increase the
possibility of having a temporary job. It has also been determined that the most important
characteristics that explain gender diﬀerences are the category of occupation, education and
the length and size of the company where the person works. Therefore these models have
increased our knowledge about some of the behaviors of people within the Ecuadorian labor
market, helping us to understand what determines temporary contracts.
Based in the analysis exposed we can derive policy recommendations that produce prac-
tical contributions in the performance of the Ecuadorian labor market. Consequently,
 I suggest that policies have to be focused in giving opportunities to Indigenous people
outside traditional agricultural, construction and low-skilled sectors. It is imperative to
help Indigenous population to be formally employed in the labor market.
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 It is important to discuss and implement public policies that stimulate the creation of
opportunities for the young unexperienced people that want to enter in the labor force.
 It is necessary to keep fostering educational policies that increase the education and
human capital of the population in order to reduce labor instability. Additionally, it is
important keep regulating the labor market for outsourced and journeymen workers.
 It will be positive to foster (private/public) investment in the Amazon Region and Coast
Region to create more job opportunities.
The results of my analysis to some extent conﬁrms the association between certain indi-
vidual, institutional and regional characteristics and the likelihood of obtaining a temporary
contract. The aim of my research is to create more public, politic and academic debate on
this important issue. This implies that there is a lot of room for further investigation that
may reveal important features of the employment situation in the Ecuadorian labor market.
7 Future Research and Limitations
While this study attempted to uncover what factors have made a person more likely to
be employed in a temporary basis, it was limited by data and time constraints. Future
research has the potential to improve model speciﬁcations by using variables that help to
account for the selection into the labor force (for example the number of children obtained
from the household roster). Future studies on this topic should try to account for the
heterogeneity in some of the comparison groups. It is also important to mention that in this
study we have informally tested for endogeneity. We did not ﬁnd serious problems in the
result exposed. Endogenity or non-orthogonality in discrete choice models happens when
the systematic part of the utility is correlated with the error term. A useful methodology
to address this problem is the control function37 method (See Greene, 2012; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). However, one disadvantage is that it involves ﬁnding instrumental variables,
which due to data constrains, we were unable to ﬁnd in the present study. Finally, following
recent advances in econometric methods and statistical packages, it might be possible to
perform a two-level multinomial logistic regression that can be implemented using generalized
structural equation modeling and see if this speciﬁcation ﬁt well the data and model correctly
the behavior of the people in the Ecuadorian labor market.
37 The control function method consists in the construction of a function that accounts for the endogenous part of the error
term which is then included as an additional variable in the model.
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Table 1: Type of Employment Situation by Sex


























Table 2: Type of Employment Situation by Age
Working Decision 15-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56+ Total
Permanent
10,258 17,097 15,104 12,468 6,548 61,475
16.69% 27.81% 24.57% 20.28% 10.65% 100%
7.12% 20.26% 19.07% 18.18% 12.64% 14.36%
Temporary
31,212 24,289 17,920 11,710 6,276 91,407
34.15% 26.57% 19.6% 12.81% 6.87% 100%
21.66% 28.78% 22.63% 17.08% 12.11% 21.35%
Other
21,090 21,629 28,510 27,833 21,751 120,813
17.46% 17.9% 23.6% 23.04% 18% 100%
14.64% 25.63% 36% 40.59% 41.97% 28.22%
Non-Working
7,578 3,484 1,805 1,227 629 14,723
51.47% 23.66% 12.26% 8.33% 4.27% 100%
5.26% 4.13% 2.28% 1.79% 1.21% 3.44%
Out of the labor force
73,955 17,901 15,848 15,332 16,616 139,652
52.96% 12.82% 11.35% 10.98% 11.9% 100%
51.32% 21.21% 20.01% 22.36% 32.06% 32.62%
Total
144,093 84,400 79,187 68,570 51,820 428,070
33.66% 19.72% 18.5% 16.02% 12.11% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
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Table 3: Type of Employment Situation by Marital Status
Working Decision Married Separated Single Total
Permanent
37,033 6,949 17,493 61,475
60.24% 11.3% 28.46% 100%
16.47% 16.78% 10.81% 14.36%
Temporary
45,474 8,840 37,093 91,407
49.75% 9.67% 40.58% 100%
20.23% 21.34% 22.92% 21.35%
Other
76,417 14,783 29,613 120,813
63.25% 12.24% 24.51% 100%
33.99% 35.69% 18.3% 28.22%
Non-Working
4,621 1,660 8,442 14,723
31.39% 11.27% 57.34% 100%
2.06% 4.01% 5.22% 3.44%
Out of the labor force
61,292 9,184 69,176 139,652
43.89% 6.58% 49.53% 100%
27.26% 22.18% 42.75% 32.62%
Total
224,837 41,416 161,817 428,070
52.52% 9.68% 37.8% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
Table 4: Type of Employment Situation by Education
Working Decision None Basic Secondary Higher no Uni University Graduate Total
Permanent
549 12,162 21,253 1,381 23,990 2,140 61,475
0.89% 19.78% 34.57% 2.25% 39.02% 3.48% 100%
2.72% 6.99% 13.90% 35.94% 32.40% 65.38% 14.36%
Temporary
3,823 42,998 30,632 681 12,784 489 91,407
4.18% 47.04% 33.51% 0.75% 13.99% 0.53% 100%
18.96% 24.73% 20.04% 17.72% 17.27% 14.94% 21.35%
Other
8,025 57,645 39,301 815 14,572 455 120,813
6.64% 47.71% 32.53% 0.67% 12.06% 0.38% 100%
39.79% 33.15% 25.71% 21.21% 19.68% 13.90% 28.22%
Non-Working
244 4,036 6,486 170 3,723 64 14,723
1.66% 27.41% 44.05% 1.15% 25.29% 0.43% 100%
1.21% 2.32% 4.24% 4.42% 5.03% 1.96% 3.44%
Out of the labor force
7,527 57,033 55,205 796 18,966 125 139,652
5.39% 40.84% 39.53% 0.57% 13.58% 0.09% 100%
37.32% 32.80% 36.11% 20.71% 25.62% 3.82% 32.62%
Total
20,168 173,874 152,877 3,843 74,035 3,273 428,070
4.71% 40.62% 35.71% 0.90% 17.30% 0.76% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
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Table 5: Type of Employment Situation by Race
Working Decision Indigenous White Mestizo Black/Afro Other Montubio Total
Permanent
1,793 2,164 19,644 2,044 34,686 1,144 61,475
2.92% 3.52% 31.95% 3.32% 56.42% 1.86% 100%
6.23% 15.04% 15.69% 8.8% 15.10% 16.82% 14.36%
Temporary
5,301 3,041 27,367 6,386 48,075 1,237 91,407
5.8% 3.33% 29.94% 6.99% 52.59% 1.35% 100%
18.42% 21.13% 21.85% 27.5% 20.93% 18.19% 21.35%
Other
14,620 3,739 34,069 5,405 61,144 1,836 120,813
12.1% 3.09% 28.20% 4.47% 50.61% 1.52% 100%
50.82% 25.98% 27.2% 23.27% 26.63% 27% 28.22%
Non-Working
490 740 5,324 883 7,016 270 14,723
3.33% 5.03% 36.16% 6% 47.65% 1.83% 100%
1.7% 5.14% 4.25% 3.80% 3.06% 3.97% 3.44%
Out of the labor force
6,567 4,709 38,835 8,508 78,719 2,314 139,652
4.70% 3.37% 27.81% 6.09% 56.37% 1.66% 100%
22.83% 32.72% 31.01% 36.63% 34.28% 34.02% 32.62%
Total
28,771 14,393 125,239 23,226 229,640 6,801 428,070
6.72% 3.36% 29.26% 5.43% 53.65% 1.59% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
Table 6: Type of Employment Situation by Category of Occupation
Working Decision
Gov. Private Out- Journey- Patrono Self Unpaid Domestic
Total
Empl. Empl. sourced man Empl. Worker
Permanent
20,515 37,408 222 597 0 0 0 2,733 61,475
33.37% 60.85% 0.36% 0.97% 0% 0% 0% 4.45% 100%
71.86% 45.58% 24.40% 1.45% 0% 0% 0% 33.28% 21.73%
Temporary
7,254 39,487 619 39,191 0 0 0 4,856 91,407
7.94% 43.20% 0.68% 42.88% 0% 0% 0% 5.31% 100%
25.41% 48.12% 68.02% 95.24% 0% 0% 0% 59.14% 32.31%
Other
0 0 0 0 10,728 79,179 30,905 0 120,812
0% 0% 0% 0% 8.88% 65.54% 25.58% 0% 100%
0% 0% 0% 0% 99.20% 98.79% 99.60% 0% 42.71%
Non-Working
779 5,170 69 1,363 86 971 124 622 9,184
8.48% 56.29% 0.75% 14.84% 0.94% 10.57% 1.35% 6.77% 100%
2.73% 6.3% 7.58% 3.31% 0.8% 1.21% 0.4% 7.58% 3.25%
Total
28,548 82,065 910 41,151 10,814 80,150 31,029 8,211 282,878
10.09% 29.01% 0.32% 14.55% 3.82% 28.33% 10.97% 2.9% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
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Table 7: Type of Employment Situation by Years of Career Services


















Table 8: Type of Employment Situation by Size of a Company


















Table 9: Type of Employment Situation by Working Hours



















Table 10: Type of Employment Situation by Government Cash Transfer


























Table 11: Type of Employment Situation by Region
Working Decision Sierra Coast Amazon Total
Permanent
37,301 21,044 3,130 61,475
60.68% 34.23% 5.09% 100%
17.07% 11.23% 14.21% 14.36%
Temporary
40,922 46,279 4,206 91,407
44.77% 50.63% 4.6% 100%
18.72% 24.69% 19.1% 21.35%
Other
68,390 45,085 7,338 120,813
56.61% 37.32% 6.07% 100%
31.29% 24.05% 33.32% 28.22%
Non-Working
6,396 7,705 622 14,723
43.44% 52.33% 4.22% 100%
2.93% 4.11% 2.82% 3.44%
Out of the labor force
65,563 67,361 6,728 139,652
46.95% 48.23% 4.82% 100%
30% 35.93% 30.55% 32.62%
Total
218,572 187,474 22,024 428,070
51.06% 43.80% 5.14% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
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Table 12: Type of Employment Situation by Area



























Table 13: Comparison of the Diﬀerent Speciﬁcations for Temporary Employment (N=152,882)
LPM Logit Probit
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Sex [Reference category: Female]
Male 0.027*** 0.0025 0.172*** 0.0157 0.101*** 0.0092
Age [Reference category: 36-45]
15-25 0.056*** 0.0033 0.349*** 0.0222 0.201*** 0.0131
26-35 0.037*** 0.0029 0.227*** 0.0193 0.133*** 0.0114
46-55 -0.039*** 0.0033 -0.286*** 0.0228 -0.170*** 0.0133
56-65 -0.067*** 0.0041 -0.541*** 0.0302 -0.314*** 0.0173
Marital Status [Reference category: Married]
Separated 0.031*** 0.0035 0.214*** 0.0229 0.122*** 0.0135
Single 0.023*** 0.0025 0.168*** 0.0167 0.099*** 0.0098
Education [Reference category: University]
None 0.173*** 0.0068 1.051*** 0.0608 0.609*** 0.0341
Basic 0.135*** 0.0033 0.735*** 0.0212 0.433*** 0.0125
Secondary 0.071*** 0.0029 0.331*** 0.0178 0.198*** 0.0105
Hgher non-University -0.011 0.0088 -0.066 0.0554 -0.042 0.0325
Graduate -0.029*** 0.0079 -0.120* 0.0549 -0.070* 0.0310
Race [Reference category: Mestizo]
Indigenous 0.050*** 0.0051 0.267*** 0.0381 0.161*** 0.0219
White -0.004 0.0057 -0.025 0.0378 -0.014 0.0223
Black-Afro -0.022*** 0.0047 -0.128*** 0.0364 -0.070** 0.0211
Other 0.011*** 0.0022 0.069*** 0.0152 0.047*** 0.0089
Montubio -0.022** 0.0081 -0.146** 0.0548 -0.084** 0.0319
Category Ocupation [Reference category: Government employee]
Private -0.014*** 0.0037 -0.227*** 0.0234 -0.121*** 0.0138
Outsourced 0.246*** 0.0137 1.190*** 0.0877 0.683*** 0.0499
Journeyman/Pawn 0.370*** 0.0048 3.662*** 0.0490 1.897*** 0.0228
Domestic Empl. 0.017** 0.0063 -0.134*** 0.0384 -0.063** 0.0227
Duration in a company [Reference category: Less than 1 year]
More than 1 year -0.256*** 0.0024 -1.480*** 0.0162 -0.876*** 0.0095
Size of company [Reference category: Less than 100 employees]
More than 100 -0.164*** 0.0031 -0.819*** 0.0190 -0.490*** 0.0112
Working hours [Reference category: Full time]
Part time 0.102*** 0.0029 0.911*** 0.0227 0.521*** 0.0131
Gov. Cash Transf. [Reference category: No]
Yes 0.086*** 0.0050 0.512*** 0.0373 0.295*** 0.0214
Region [Reference category: Sierra-Highlands]
Coast 0.093*** 0.0022 0.651*** 0.0146 0.378*** 0.0086
Amazon 0.055*** 0.0048 0.355*** 0.0317 0.201*** 0.0185
Area [Reference category: Urban]
Rural 0.036*** 0.0025 0.254*** 0.0176 0.139*** 0.0102
Intercept 0.544*** 0.0054 0.296*** 0.0349 0.165*** 0.0205
Log-Lik Full Model: -71441.236 -65918.566 -66079.482
Adjusted R2: 0.380 - -
McFadden's Adj R2: - 0.360 0.359
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2: - 0.520 0.518
AIC: 142940.471 131895.132 132216.964
BIC': 143228.656 132183.317 132505.149
∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Table 14: Logistic Regression for Temporary Employment (N=152,882)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Odds Ratio
Sex [Reference category: Female]
Male 0.172*** 0.0157 0.034 1.188
Age [Reference category: 36-45]
15-25 0.349*** 0.0222 0.063 1.418
26-35 0.227*** 0.0193 0.043 1.255
46-55 -0.286*** 0.0228 -0.060 0.751
56-65 -0.541*** 0.0302 -0.119 0.582
Marital Status [Reference category: Married]
Separated 0.214*** 0.0229 0.041 1.239
Single 0.168*** 0.0167 0.032 1.183
Education [Reference category: University]
None 1.051*** 0.0608 0.189 2.860
Basic 0.735*** 0.0212 0.143 2.085
Secondary 0.331*** 0.0178 0.071 1.393
Hgher non-University -0.066 0.0554 -0.015 0.936
Graduate -0.120* 0.0549 -0.028 0.887
Race [Reference category: Mestizo]
Indigenous 0.267*** 0.0381 0.049 1.306
White -0.025 0.0378 -0.005 0.975
Black-Afro -0.128*** 0.0364 -0.026 0.880
Other 0.069*** 0.0152 0.013 1.071
Montubio -0.146** 0.0548 -0.030 0.864
Category Ocupation [Reference category: Government employee]
Private -0.227*** 0.0234 -0.056 0.797
Outsourced 1.190*** 0.0877 0.250 3.286
Journeyman/Pawn 3.662*** 0.0490 0.427 38.930
Domestic Empl. -0.134*** 0.0384 -0.033 0.875
Duration in a company [Reference category: Less than 1 year]
More than 1 year -1.480*** 0.0162 -0.237 0.228
Size of company [Reference category: Less than 100 employees]
More than 100 -0.819*** 0.0190 -0.167 0.441
Working hours [Reference category: Full time]
Part time 0.911*** 0.0227 0.148 2.487
Gov. Cash Transf. [Reference category: No]
Yes 0.512*** 0.0373 0.087 1.669
Region [Reference category: Sierra-Highlands]
Coast 0.651*** 0.0146 0.123 1.917
Amazon 0.355*** 0.0317 0.072 1.426
Area [Reference category: Urban]
Rural 0.254*** 0.0176 0.048 1.290
Intercept 0.296*** 0.0349 1.344
∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Table 15: Logistic Regression for Temporary Employment with Sex Interaction (N=152,882)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Odds Ratio
Sex [Reference category: Female]
Men 0.813*** 0.1400 0.165 2.254
Age [Reference category: 36-45]
15 -25 0.247*** 0.0290 0.046 1.281
26-35 0.157*** 0.0252 0.030 1.170
46-55 -0.192*** 0.0296 -0.039 0.826
56-65 -0.400*** 0.0377 -0.085 0.670
Marital Status [Reference category: Married]
Separated 0.196*** 0.0366 0.038 1.216
Single 0.223*** 0.0220 0.043 1.250
Education [Reference category: University]
None 1.010*** 0.0785 0.182 2.745
Basic 0.714*** 0.0269 0.139 2.042
Secondary 0.313*** 0.0237 0.067 1.368
Higher non-University -0.043 0.0766 -0.010 0.958
Graduate -0.162* 0.0785 -0.037 0.850
Race [Reference category: Mestizo]
Indigenous 0.287*** 0.0491 0.051 1.332
White -0.004 0.0492 -0.001 0.996
Black-Afro -0.181*** 0.0455 -0.036 0.835
Other 0.010 0.0197 0.002 1.010
Montubio -0.181* 0.0710 -0.036 0.835
Category Ocupation [Reference category: Government employee]
Government -3.870*** 0.0554 -0.466 0.021
Private -3.877*** 0.0473 -0.468 0.021
Outsourced -2.536*** 0.1070 -0.180 0.079
Domestic Empl. -4.272*** 0.1170 -0.565 0.014
Duration in a company [Reference category: Less than 1 year]
More than 1 year -1.440*** 0.0214 -0.232 0.237
Size of company [Reference category: Less than 100 employees]
More than 100 -0.890*** 0.0230 -0.182 0.411
Working hours [Reference category: Full time]
Part time 1.017*** 0.0349 0.162 2.765
Gov. Cash Transf. [Reference category: No]
Yes 0.379** 0.1200 0.067 1.461
Region [Reference category: Sierra-Highlands]
Coast 0.630*** 0.0188 0.119 1.877
Amazon 0.376*** 0.0411 0.077 1.457
Area [Reference category: Urban]
Rural 0.198*** 0.0222 0.037 1.219
Age x Sex
(15 -25)×Sex 0.242*** 0.0454 0.044 1.274
(26-35)×Sex 0.178*** 0.0393 0.033 1.195
(46-55)×Sex -0.244*** 0.0468 -0.049 0.784
(56-65)×Sex -0.411*** 0.0641 -0.086 0.663
MaritalSt x Sex
(Separated)×Sex 0.041 0.0475 0.008 1.042
(Single)×Sex -0.119*** 0.0341 -0.023 0.888
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Table 15: Logistic Regression for Temporary Employment with Sex Interaction (N=152,882)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Odds Ratio
Education x Sex
(None)×Sex 0.172 0.1250 0.032 1.188
(Basic)×Sex 0.053 0.0446 0.010 1.055
(Secondary)×Sex 0.102** 0.0363 0.019 1.107
(Higher non-University)×Sex -0.037 0.111 -0.007 0.964
(Graduate)×Sex 0.051 0.110 0.010 1.052
Race x Sex
(Indigenous)×Sex -0.060 0.0782 -0.012 0.942
(White)×Sex -0.044 0.0774 -0.008 0.957
(Black-Afro)×Sex 0.112 0.0762 0.021 1.118
(Other)×Sex 0.150*** 0.0311 0.028 1.162
(Montubio)×Sex 0.107 0.112 0.020 1.112
Catoccupation x Sex
(Government)×Sex 0.771*** 0.130 0.125 2.162
(Private)×Sex 0.288* 0.121 0.053 1.333
(Outsourced)×Sex 0.556* 0.247 0.092 1.743
(Domestic Empl.)×Sex 0.972*** 0.163 0.146 2.644
Duration comp x Sex
(More than 1 year)×Sex -0.101** 0.0328 -0.020 0.904
Sizeofcompany x Sex
(More than 100)×Sex 0.229*** 0.0410 0.042 1.257
Workinghours x Sex
(Part time)×Sex -0.142** 0.0464 -0.027 0.867
Gov.CashTransf. x Sex
(Yes)×Sex 0.167 0.127 0.031 1.182
Region x Sex
(Coast)×Sex 0.037 0.0303 0.007 1.038
(Amazon)×Sex -0.054 0.0648 -0.012 0.948
Area x Sex
(Rural)×Sex 0.124*** 0.0369 0.024 1.132
Intercept 3.434*** 0.119 31.017
∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Table 16: Results of Fairlie Decomposition for Temporary Employment
Number of Obs. = 152,882
Number of Obs. (male) = 101,183
Number of Obs. (female) = 51,669
Pr(Y!=0|G=0) = 0.649
Pr(Y!=0|G=1) = 0.498
Explained gender diﬀerence = 0.151
Total gender diﬀerence = 0.082
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. %
Age -0.088*** 0.0079 0.056
Marital Status 0.116*** 0.0104 -0.278
Education -0.202*** 0.0082 2.194
Race -0.025*** 0.0072 0.019
Category Ocupation 1.199*** 0.0128 7.484
Duration in a company -1.338*** 0.0213 -1.650
Size of company -0.523*** 0.0201 0.827
Working hours -1.063*** 0.0340 -1.084
Government Cash Transfer 0.418*** 0.112 -0.387
Region 0.435*** 0.0147 0.480
Area -0.394*** 0.0206 0.546
Intercept 1.759*** 0.0543
∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Table 17: Multinomial Logistic Regression for Female* (N=219,777)
Permanent Other Non-Working Out of the labor force
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. RRR Coef. Std. Err. RRR Coef. Std. Err. RRR Coef. Std. Err. RRR
Age [Reference category: 36-45]
15-25 -1.171*** 0.0308 0.310 -0.751*** 0.0257 0.472 0.725*** 0.0440 2.064 0.952*** 0.0235 2.591
26-35 -0.458*** 0.0259 0.633 -0.573*** 0.0224 0.564 0.263*** 0.0420 1.301 -0.224*** 0.0219 0.800
46-55 0.524*** 0.0306 1.688 0.509*** 0.0266 1.663 0.134* 0.0554 1.143 0.582*** 0.0267 1.790
56-65 0.930*** 0.0418 2.534 1.088*** 0.0362 2.969 -0.072 0.0857 0.930 1.582*** 0.0358 4.865
Marital Status [Reference category: Married]
Separated -0.372*** 0.0258 0.690 -0.619*** 0.0217 0.539 -0.204*** 0.0396 0.815 -1.472*** 0.0220 0.230
Single -0.081*** 0.0237 0.922 -0.599*** 0.0208 0.550 -0.087* 0.0341 0.917 -0.698*** 0.0190 0.498
Education [Reference category: University]
None -2.189*** 0.0799 0.112 0.676*** 0.0445 1.965 -0.260** 0.0975 0.771 0.957*** 0.0426 2.604
Basic -1.368*** 0.0275 0.255 0.712*** 0.0239 2.038 -0.153*** 0.0385 0.858 0.776*** 0.0216 2.173
Secondary -0.717*** 0.0228 0.488 0.712*** 0.0226 2.037 0.137*** 0.0331 1.147 0.744*** 0.0201 2.105
Hgher non-University 0.024 0.0717 1.024 0.090 0.0793 1.094 -0.009 0.124 0.991 0.037 0.0733 1.037
Graduate 0.291*** 0.0736 1.338 -0.855*** 0.106 0.425 -0.517** 0.177 0.596 -1.712*** 0.133 0.181
Race [Reference category: Mestizo]
Indigenous -0.016 0.0515 0.985 0.644*** 0.0334 1.904 -0.512*** 0.0737 0.599 -0.398*** 0.0340 0.672
White 0.012 0.0515 1.012 -0.042 0.0447 0.959 0.0983 0.0649 1.103 -0.0012 0.0408 0.999
Black-Afro 0.078 0.0528 1.081 -0.224*** 0.0415 0.800 0.0557 0.0615 1.057 0.234*** 0.0362 1.263
Other -0.073*** 0.0204 0.930 -0.040* 0.0177 0.961 -0.316*** 0.0289 0.729 0.172*** 0.0163 1.187
Montubio 0.082 0.0738 1.086 0.152* 0.0676 1.164 0.101 0.104 1.107 0.345*** 0.0629 1.412
Gov. Cash Transf. [Reference category: No]
Yes -0.885*** 0.0359 0.413 -0.166*** 0.0219 0.847 -0.208*** 0.0429 0.812 0.085*** 0.0209 1.089
Region [Reference category: Sierra-Highlands]
Coast -0.403*** 0.0202 0.668 -0.333*** 0.0171 0.717 0.408*** 0.0282 1.504 0.423*** 0.0157 1.526
Amazon -0.034 0.0424 0.966 -0.097** 0.0351 0.908 -0.094 0.0676 0.911 0.101** 0.0335 1.107
Area [Reference category: Urban]
Rural -0.446*** 0.0253 0.640 0.243*** 0.0183 1.276 -0.276*** 0.0329 0.759 0.079*** 0.0170 1.082
Intercept 1.354*** 0.0295 3.874 0.705*** 0.0282 2.024 -1.421*** 0.0487 0.242 0.371*** 0.0267 1.448
∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001
*Base Category: Temporary Employment
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Table 18: Multinomial Logistic Regression for Male* (N=208,292)
Permanent Other Non-Working Out of the labor force
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. RRR Coef. Std. Err. RRR Coef. Std. Err. RRR Coef. Std. Err. RRR
Age [Reference category: 36-45]
15-25 -0.678*** 0.0239 0.508 -0.870*** 0.0195 0.419 0.535*** 0.0470 1.707 2.038*** 0.0393 7.673
26-35 -0.216*** 0.0206 0.806 -0.634*** 0.0180 0.530 0.083 0.0485 1.086 -0.101* 0.0452 0.904
46-55 0.225*** 0.0229 1.253 0.442*** 0.0185 1.556 0.315*** 0.0580 1.370 1.011*** 0.0484 2.749
56-65 0.428*** 0.0274 1.535 0.884*** 0.0213 2.420 0.819*** 0.0633 2.267 2.590*** 0.0452 13.326
Marital Status [Reference category: Married]
Separated -0.294*** 0.0295 0.746 -0.113*** 0.0238 0.893 0.560*** 0.0565 1.751 0.533*** 0.0429 1.704
Single -0.382*** 0.0187 0.682 0.011 0.0154 1.011 1.009*** 0.0345 2.742 2.039*** 0.0245 7.686
Education [Reference category: University]
None -2.440*** 0.0628 0.087 -0.827*** 0.0343 0.437 -1.259*** 0.105 0.284 -0.073 0.0443 0.930
Basic -1.664*** 0.0217 0.189 -0.499*** 0.0201 0.607 -1.001*** 0.0387 0.368 -0.846*** 0.0243 0.429
Secondary -0.737*** 0.0199 0.478 -0.139*** 0.0201 0.870 -0.421*** 0.0352 0.656 -0.453*** 0.0234 0.636
Hgher non-University 0.136* 0.0689 1.146 -0.0374 0.0746 0.963 0.069 0.127 1.072 -0.578*** 0.0989 0.561
Graduate 0.486*** 0.0734 1.626 -0.527*** 0.0891 0.590 -0.369* 0.186 0.691 -0.711*** 0.161 0.491
Race [Reference category: Mestizo]
Indigenous -0.123** 0.0388 0.884 0.672*** 0.0251 1.958 -0.010 0.0720 0.990 0.191*** 0.0352 1.210
White 0.0511 0.0402 1.052 0.0301 0.0337 1.031 0.237*** 0.0639 1.267 0.188*** 0.0437 1.207
Black-Afro -0.108** 0.0359 0.898 -0.137*** 0.0257 0.872 -0.015 0.0574 0.985 -0.042 0.0353 0.959
Other 0.007 0.0159 1.007 -0.026 0.0135 0.975 -0.157*** 0.0286 0.854 0.268*** 0.0173 1.308
Montubio 0.126* 0.0562 1.134 0.121* 0.0489 1.128 0.186* 0.0944 1.204 0.357*** 0.0613 1.429
Gov. Cash Transf. [Reference category: No]
Yes -0.804*** 0.0977 0.447 0.232*** 0.0428 1.261 -0.057 0.144 0.945 1.484*** 0.0509 4.412
Region [Reference category: Sierra-Highlands]
Coast -0.683*** 0.0151 0.505 -0.407*** 0.0125 0.666 -0.068* 0.0273 0.934 -0.481*** 0.0160 0.618
Amazon -0.063 0.0331 0.939 0.065* 0.0268 1.068 -0.002 0.0637 0.998 -0.116*** 0.0351 0.891
Area [Reference category: Urban]
Rural -0.798*** 0.0173 0.450 -0.025 0.0128 0.976 -1.090*** 0.0329 0.336 -0.822*** 0.0167 0.440
Intercept 1.221*** 0.0247 3.390 0.640*** 0.0234 1.896 -2.085*** 0.0535 0.124 -2.647*** 0.0454 0.071
∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001
*Base Category: Temporary Employment
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Table 19: Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit (N=282,878)
Temporary Employment Participate Pr(Temp1=1,Participate=1)
Delta-method
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err
Sex [Reference category: Female]
Men 0.043*** 0.0082 0.171*** 0.011 0.008*** 0.001
Age [Reference category: 36-45]
15 -25 0.346*** 0.0113 -0.209*** 0.0161 0.058*** 0.002
26-35 0.158*** 0.0102 -0.100*** 0.0151 0.027*** 0.002
46-55 -0.174*** 0.0120 -0.017 0.0181 -0.029*** 0.002
56-65 -0.292*** 0.0154 -0.057** 0.0218 -0.049*** 0.003
Marital Status [Reference category: Married]
Separated 0.117*** 0.0119 -0.139*** 0.0157 0.019*** 0.002
Single 0.082*** 0.0086 -0.174*** 0.0119 0.013*** 0.001
Education [Reference category: University]
None 0.620*** 0.0281 0.104* 0.0357 0.106*** 0.005
Basic 0.410*** 0.0111 0.102*** 0.0157 0.071*** 0.002
Secondary 0.199*** 0.0095 -0.037* 0.0134 0.035*** 0.002
Higher non-University -0.045 0.0302 -0.014 0.0459 -0.008 0.005
Graduate -0.159*** 0.0297 0.348*** 0.0599 -0.027*** 0.005
Race [Reference category: Mestizo]
Indigenous 0.166*** 0.0192 0.160*** 0.0278 0.028*** 0.003
White -0.020 0.0193 -0.060* 0.0245 -0.004 0.003
Black-Afro -0.032 0.0177 -0.013 0.0224 -0.005 0.003
Other 0.056*** 0.0078 0.112*** 0.0108 0.010*** 0.001
Montubio -0.091 0.0280 -0.022 0.0364 -0.01** 0.005
Category Ocupation [Reference category: Government employee]
Private 0.323*** 0.0104 -0.325*** 0.0185 0.119*** 0.004
Outsourced 0.764*** 0.0438 -0.412*** 0.0612 0.280*** 0.015
Journeyman/Pawn 1.809*** 0.0156 -0.083** 0.0241 0.538*** 0.004
Patrono -7.100 3553.175 0.484*** 0.0461 -0.374*** 0.004
Self Employed -7.265 1269.389 0.267*** 0.0215 -0.374*** 0.004
Unpaid Work -7.444 2008.666 0.664*** 0.0353 -0.374*** 0.004
Domestic Empl. 0.461*** 0.0183 -0.351*** 0.0284 0.171*** 0.007
Gov. Cash Transf. [Reference category: No]
Yes 0.290*** 0.0178 -0.059* 0.0212 0.0474*** 0.003
Region [Reference category: Sierra-Highlands]
Coast 0.258*** 0.0075 -0.132*** 0.0105 0.043*** 0.001
Amazon 0.197*** 0.0165 0.008 0.0245 0.033*** 0.003
Area [Reference category: Urban]
Rural 0.197*** 0.0090 0.354*** 0.0133 0.034*** 0.002
Intercept -0.970*** 0.0138 1.892*** 0.0221
/athrho 2.076*** 0.0429
rho 0.969*** 0.0026
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 18353.5 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
∗p < 0.05 ∗∗p < 0.01 ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Unemp. Rate Men Unemp. Rate Women
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
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Underemp. Men Underemp. Women
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
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Economically Active Population Working Age Population
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)



























































Participation Men Participation Women
Source: ENEMDU (INEC)
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(c) Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit


















D: Decision of the person W-T: Work under temporary contract. W-NT: Work under no temporary contract. W-F: Work under
permanent contract. W-O: Work under other circumstances (Self-employment, etc.). N-W: No working (unemployed). R: Retired or
non-working voluntarily. W: Work. NWA:No working all (unemployed, retired, etc.).
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